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Overcoming Hurdles in the Enforceability 
of Make-Whole Provisions 
BRIAN PATRICK MCBRIDE* 
There have been recent conflicting decisions in U.S. dis-
trict courts of New York, Delaware, and others states re-
garding to the enforceability of make-whole provisions in 
bankruptcy. The ambiguity created by the courts’ decisions 
has caused uncertainty for all parties involved in these kinds 
of loan documents. This comment is an analysis of the en-
forceability of make-whole provisions in the context of bank-
ruptcy in light of the recent decisions. In order for a make-
whole or a no-call provision to be upheld, a number of hur-
dles must be cleared. The provisions must be valid under 
both state law and bankruptcy law. Make-whole provisions 
are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy under state 
law to the extent that they are not true penalties under a liq-
uidated damages analysis. Once bankruptcy comes into 
play, the provisions must withstand a number of hurdles. In 
order to be enforceable in bankruptcy, a make-whole provi-
sion must be a valid liquidated damages claim under state 
law, it must be provided for and triggered under the contrac-
tual agreement, and it must not be tantamount to unmatured 
interest.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the main goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to balance the 
interest of creditors, both secured and unsecured, and debtors in an 
equitable manner.1 These competing interests in bankruptcy often 
put secured creditors in a detrimental position because the bank-
ruptcy court is trying to reach an equitable distribution for all.2 One 
of the ways a secured creditor’s position can be impacted negatively 
is by the disallowance of defeasance fees.3 In instances where disal-
lowance occurs, value is being reallocated from secured creditors 
and given to unsecured creditors. 
Bond indentures and credit agreements often have provisions 
that limit the ability of a debtor to repay its debt before maturity. 
One type of provision, termed a no-call, does not allow for prepay-
ment of a loan,4 while other types of provisions permit prepayment 
as long as the debtor agrees to pay a prepayment fee.5 Prepayment 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Scary Nightmares For Secured Lenders, Presented at the 18th Annual 
American Bankruptcy Institute Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop, 246 (Jul. 18–
21, 2013), http://materials.abi.org/sites/default/files/2013/Jul/ScaryNightmares
.pdf [hereinafter Scary Nightmares]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 263 (“Defeasance fees are prepayment penalties intended to compen-
sate a secured creditor for the bargained-for interest it loses when a debtor pays 
the principal due prior to the loan’s maturity date.”). 
 4 Scott K. Charles & Emil A. Kleinhaus, Prepayment Clauses in Bankruptcy, 
15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2007). 
 5 Id. at 537. 
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fee type provisions have been commonly referred to as make-whole 
provisions. Defeasance fees are supposed to compensate lenders for 
the loss of expected interest payments when the debtor pays the prin-
cipal prior to the maturity date.6 The fees are calculated in two dif-
ferent ways: some are based on yield maintenance formulas, and 
others are based on a fixed percentage of the amount being prepaid.7 
Make-whole premiums help determine the rights of the borrower 
and the lender if the borrower decides to prepay the loan.8 A rational 
borrower will repay a loan when the transaction costs are lower than 
the amount of savings that a new loan will generate.9 In other words, 
debtors may seek to refinance their loans when interest rates drop. 
By replacing a high interest rate loan with a low interest rate loan, 
debtors can create savings. This is costly to the original lender be-
cause they will lose the expected stream of higher interest payments. 
Therefore, savvy lenders will want to make sure that if interest rates 
go down, their yields are protected.10 Most lenders will have fac-
tored the borrower’s interest payments into their future cash flow 
analysis.11 It is pertinent that courts clarify the enforceability of de-
feasance fees before rising interest rates diminish the issues pertain-
ing to make-whole premiums.12 
Prepayment premiums are generally enforceable outside of 
bankruptcy under state law to the extent that they are not true pen-
alties under a liquidated damages analysis. In addition to undergoing 
a liquidated damages analysis under state law, the provision must be 
triggered under the loan agreement in order to be enforceable. The 
issue is more complicated if the debtor seeks to refinance its debt in 
bankruptcy. Once in bankruptcy, state law continues to apply, but 
there are additional hurdles that the Bankruptcy Code imposes. First, 
                                                                                                             
 
 6 Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 263. 
 7 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 538. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See id. (“Prepayment clauses, in sum, allow a lender to negotiate for yield 
protection and a borrower to negotiate for freedom of action.”). 
 
 11 Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 264. 
 12 See G. Ray Warner, Make Whole Premiums and Unmatured Interest, GT 
RESTRUCTURING REVIEW (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.gtlaw-restructurin-
greview.com/2014/09/make-whole-premiums-and-unmatured-interest/. 
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the Code provides that a secured creditor is entitled to interest on its 
claim and “any reasonable fees, costs, or other charges provided for 
under the agreement,” to the extent the secured creditor is overse-
cured.13 This is not a large hurdle to clear because lenders can easily 
provide for make-whole provisions in their agreements. However, 
there is a question of whether the make-whole provision is reasona-
ble. Second, the Code provides that a creditor’s claim cannot include 
“unmatured interest.”14  The third limitation is that there must in fact 
be a pre-payment.15  If the bankruptcy filing itself accelerated the 
loan, any plan that would subsequently refinance the indebtedness 
would then be a payment, not a prepayment. 
The Code provides that “[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured 
by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a 
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in 
the estate’s interest in such property.”16 Thus, a prepayment penalty 
may be allowed under bankruptcy law only to the extent the value 
of the secured creditor’s collateral exceeds its claim and the loan 
agreement provides for a prepayment penalty. Section 502 permits 
a claim unless, among other things, it amounts to a payment for un-
matured interest.17 Therefore, even if the value of the collateral ex-
ceeds the claim and the provision is triggered under the loan agree-
ment, a prepayment penalty will not be enforceable if a court renders 
the provision tantamount to unmatured interest. 
The third complication with the Code is that loan agreements 
frequently provide that the filing of bankruptcy is an event of default 
that automatically accelerates the debt.18  Acceleration makes the 
loan due immediately, i.e., it accelerates the loan’s maturity.  So if 
bankruptcy accelerates the loan, this raises the question of whether 
refinancing after acceleration qualifies as a prepayment. 
                                                                                                             
 13 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 14 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2012). 
 15 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 546. 
 
 16 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). 
 17 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2012). 
 18 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 546. 
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If a lender purposely accelerates debt, either inside or outside of 
bankruptcy, courts have held that the lender has waived their con-
tractual rights to prepayment fees.19 Courts have held this because, 
upon acceleration, the debt has matured.  This maturation of the debt 
means that any subsequent payment can no longer be seen as a pre-
payment.20 Also, most prepayment provisions are only enforceable 
if the debtor takes the “option” to prepay.21 
Generally, make-whole provisions are enforceable under state 
law when the debtor is outside of bankruptcy.22 Once the debtor is 
in bankruptcy, the court’s analysis should begin by determining 
whether the agreement covers prepayment penalties and, if so, (1) 
whether that provision is an unenforceable penalty and (2) whether 
that provision has been triggered. If the provision is a valid liqui-
dated damages clause and it has been triggered under the loan doc-
ument, then the court should consider whether or not the provision 
should be disallowed as unmatured interest. Courts are split on 
whether make-whole provisions are allowable as liquidated dam-
ages in bankruptcy or disallowable as unmatured interest.23 All of 
these positions presuppose that a prepayment clause is still applica-
ble after the automatic acceleration of a debt.24 
No-call provisions are generally unenforceable in bankruptcy 
because they violate the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of reorganization 
by allowing the creditor to contract around it.25 However, whether 
or not damages may be collected for the breach of a no-call is an-
other story. No-call provisions simply memorialize the common law 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. at 547. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, The Story of YMPS 
(“Yield Maintenance Premiums”) in Bankruptcy, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 
449, 450–51 (Spring 2005). 
 
 23 Matthew I. Knepper, Lipstick on a Pig: Disallowing Make-Whole Clauses 
as Unmatured Interest, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 40, 40–41 (Dec. 2013) (noting 
that the characterization of make-wholes as allowable liquidated damages claims 
is the current majority position.). 
 24 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 556. 
 25 Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 264. 
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default rule of “perfect tender in time.”26 Although this rule has been 
highly criticized, it remains the law in some states and does not al-
low for prepayment of a loan unless the contract allows for it.27 
Make-whole premiums effectively contract out of the default rule 
and allow prepayment as long as the premium is paid.28 
There are important questions of whether make-whole provi-
sions are beneficial overall. When a make-whole provision is en-
forced in bankruptcy, a creditor is given a larger claim against the 
estate, which diverts money away from unsecured creditors. If 
make-whole provisions are enforced, this effectively allows two pri-
vate parties, the lender and the borrower, to contract around a public 
law. A finely drafted lending agreement may be able to displace the 
Bankruptcy Code in determining the distribution of the estate. 
This Comment will discuss these larger policy issues created by 
the enforcement of make-whole provisions. This Comment focuses 
on cases where the effect of the automatic acceleration due to a 
bankruptcy filing is not contemplated in the loan document. There 
have been recent conflicting decisions in U.S. district courts of New 
York, Delaware, and others states regarding to the enforceability of 
defeasance fees in bankruptcy. The ambiguity created by the courts’ 
decisions has caused uncertainty for all parties involved in these 
kinds of loan documents. The goal of this Comment is to analyze 
when these provisions should be enforceable. In order for a make-
whole or a no-call provision to be upheld, a number of hurdles must 
be cleared. The provisions must be valid under both state law and 
bankruptcy law. Part II of this Comment will address whether or not 
these provisions should be deemed valid liquidated damages clauses 
under the governing state law. Part II of this Comment will also ad-
dress situations where the creditor is oversecured, and whether or 
not the provision must pass the reasonableness test under section 
506(b) of the Code. Part III of this Comment will address whether 
or not the plain language of the loan documents provides for defea-
sance fees in the given circumstances. Part IV of this Comment will 
                                                                                                             
 26 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 540–41 (explaining that a debtor 
does not have the right to pay off a loan before maturity in the absence of a con-
tract term to the contrary). 
 27 Id. at 541. 
 28 Id. at 543. 
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address whether or not these types of provisions violate the Code’s 
prohibition on unmatured interest. Part V of this Comment will ad-
dress situations where the debtor is solvent and how this changes the 
analysis. Finally, Part VI of this Comment will address the implica-
tions of these rulings going forward and important policy consider-
ations. Part VII will conclude the Comment. 
I.   LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER STATE LAW 
The first inquiry in the enforceability of make-whole provisions 
is whether the provision is enforceable as a valid liquidated damage 
claim under state law. Bankruptcy courts have differed on the 
method by which to calculate liquidated damages, but courts agree 
that a liquidated damages analysis should be applied.29 Some courts 
have held that the prepayment premium must reflect actual damages 
that have been incurred in order to be a valid liquidated damages 
clause.30 Other courts have held that parties should be free to con-
tract, under a liquidated damages clause, for whatever amount based 
on a calculation they deem reasonable as long as it is not inequitable 
and unconscionable.31 The freedom of contract line of thought ar-
gues that it should not matter whether or not the prepayment clause 
is related to the actual amount of damages incurred.32 Most courts 
will only construe a prepayment clause as a liquidated damages pro-
vision if the loan document says that the provision should be con-
strued that way or the lender successfully makes that argument in 
court.33 
In School Specialty, the court stated that under New York state 
law, a prepayment premium will be enforceable as liquidated dam-
ages when “(i) actual damages are difficult to determine, and (ii) the 
sum stipulated is not ‘plainly disproportionate’ to the possible 
loss.”34 The reasonableness of the damages is determined at the time 
                                                                                                             
 29 See John C. Murray, Prepayment Premiums: A Bankruptcy Court Analysis 
of Reasonableness and Liquidated Damages, 105 COM. L.J. 217 (2000). 
 30 Id. at 223. 
 31 Id. at 227–28. 
 32 Id. at 228. 
 33 But see In re Hidden Lake Ltd. P’ship, 247 B.R. 722, 726 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 2000); Id. at 235. 
 34 In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, 2013 WL 1838513, *2 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Apr. 22, 2013). 
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the agreement was formed.35 The court also said that when deter-
mining whether or not the loss is “plainly disproportionate,” it will 
consider “(i) whether the prepayment fee is calculated so that the 
lender will receive its bargained-for yield, and (ii) whether the pre-
payment fee is the result of an arms-length transaction between rep-
resented sophisticated parties.”36 Generally, courts like the one in 
School Specialty will uphold yield maintenance type make-whole 
provisions as valid liquidated damages.37 Courts will also generally 
reject make-wholes with minimum charge provisions that result in 
automatic premiums.38 
Some courts have applied state liquidated damages analyses and 
found the prepayment provisions were penalties. In Skyler Ridge, 
the court found that the prepayment provision was a penalty because 
the yield was tied to certain U.S. treasury instruments, and this was 
not the appropriate way to calculate the premium.39 The Court said 
that the rate should have been that of a comparable first mortgage 
market rate.40 Also, the lender failed to convert the difference in the 
interest rates to present value.41 The court went on to hold that the 
provision was unenforceable under section 506(b) for the same rea-
sons it was unenforceable under Kansas state law.42 Because the par-
ties agreed to treat the make-whole provision as liquidated damages, 
the court conceded that there was no need for the court to question 
this characterization.43 Because these cases found the prepayment 
provisions unenforceable under state law, the court did not have 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at *3 (citing In re Vanderveer Estates Holdings, Inc., 283 B.R. 122, 130 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
 37 Jeffrey H. Davidson, No-Call and Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy, 
SV036 ALI-ABA 497, 501 (May 1–2, 2014). 
 38 Id. 
 39 In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500, 505 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); see also In 
re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1000–02 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (holding 
that the prepayment premium was an unenforceable penalty under state law and 
unreasonable under section 506(b) because the contractual formula would have 
charged an amount equal to 25% of the principle. Also, the court was concerned 
that paying this premium would leave nothing for the other creditors). 
 40 Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 505. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 507. 
 43 Id. at 504. 
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much opportunity to consider their effectiveness under section 
506(b).44 
In AJ Lane & Co., the court held that the Bankruptcy Code alone 
is the test for whether or not the provisions should be enforced and 
used common law to fill in the reasonableness standard.45 Here, the 
prepayment provision was a fixed percentage of the amount out-
standing.46 The court found that the provision did not approximate 
anticipated or actual damages because interest rates had actually 
risen and the lender benefited from the prepayment.47 The court also 
found that damages were not difficult to prove.48 This case is a good 
example of the large assumptions some courts make about lenders 
being able to determine the market rate and other variables when 
trying to approximate damages.49 
Other courts have found provisions enforceable under state law 
regardless of whether they reflect actual damages or overcompen-
sate the lender. In Hidden Lake, the court held that the yield-mainte-
nance make-whole provision was enforceable as a liquidated dam-
ages clause.50 Hidden Lake, the debtor, procured a loan from Atena, 
the creditor, to finance a large apartment building.51 Multiple times 
over the course of the agreement, the debtor attempted to modify the 
prepayment clause to no avail.52 Before the maturity date, the debtor 
defaulted and the lender accelerated the loan, which subsequently 
led to the debtor filing for bankruptcy.53 Even though the loan doc-
ument did not provide that the premium be construed as a liquidated 
damages claim, the court held it to be anyway.54 While the court 
                                                                                                             
 44 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 560. 
 45 In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 113 B.R. 821, 823–25 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); 
Murray, supra note 29, at 225; Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 560–61. 
 46 A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 822–23 (noting that the make-whole provision was 
based on a formula that took the amount prepaid times one percent (1%) times the 
number of years or portions thereof expressed as a fraction remaining on term of 
the Loan). 
 47 Id. at 829. 
 48 Id. at 829–30. 
 49 Murray, supra note 29, at 226. 
 50 Id. at 218. 
 51 In re Hidden Lake Ltd. P’ship, 247 B.R. 722, 724–25 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2000). 
 52 Id. at 725–26. 
 53 Id. at 726. 
 54 Id. 
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acknowledged that the premium would overcompensate the lender 
and take away unencumbered assets from the pool, it ultimately up-
held the provision because sophisticated parties made a reasonable 
estimation of the damages at the time the contract was made.55 The 
debtor argued that the clause was not a liquidated damages provision 
because the premium was not sufficiently uncertain under Ohio 
law.56 The court found that “[t]here are significant variables which 
make the exact calculation of potential losses from prepayment dif-
ficult to calculate.”57 The Hidden Lakes decision did not address 
whether or not the premium needed to be reasonable under 506(b). 
This decision comports with earlier case law that is discussed below. 
A.   Reasonableness Test Under Code Section 506(b) 
In situations where the creditor is oversecured, courts are split 
on whether or not the provision must also pass a reasonableness test 
under section 506(b) of the Code in addition to a liquidated damages 
analysis. Prepayment premiums must be valid under both state law 
and bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy courts in various jurisdictions have 
struggled with how a liquidated damages analysis should be per-
formed, and whether the premium must be reasonable under section 
506(b).58 Section 506(b) of the Code allows for an oversecured cred-
itor, up to the value of the collateral, to collect interest on the claim 
and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges that are provided for in 
the loan documents.59 If the premium is characterized as interest or 
as a reasonable fee or charge, the premium should be enforceable.60 
Prepayment fees are usually characterized as “charges” or “fees” 
under section 506(b), which makes them subject to a reasonableness 
test.61 Courts have interpreted the relationship between a state law 
                                                                                                             
 55 Id. at 728–29. 
 56 Richard F. Casher, Prepayment Premiums: Hidden Lake is a Hidden Gem, 
19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 32 (Nov. 2000). 
 57 Hidden Lake, 247 B.R. at 726–27 (explaining the difficulty in determining 
the loan amount, the term remaining, the interest rate available, and whether a 
suitable reinvestment vehicle will be available). 
 58 Murray, supra note 29, at 221. 
 59 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2012). 
 60 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 557. 
 61 Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 265; Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 
4, at 557. 
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liquidated damages analysis and a reasonableness test under section 
506(b) in different ways. Some courts have held that the provision 
must pass both tests.62 These courts have reasoned that section 
506(b) simply adds a reasonableness requirement to section 
502(b)(1)’s requirement that “the validity of claims be determined 
according to non-bankruptcy law.”63 Other courts have held that if a 
defeasance fee is valid under state law, then it is reasonable under 
section 506(b).64 This second interpretation equates the two anal-
yses. Others see the liquidated damages analysis as a “guidepost” in 
determining reasonableness.65 
In Foertsch, the court stated that “an oversecured creditor in 
bankruptcy has ‘a perfected security interest’ in the equity cushion 
afforded by the value of the collateral which secures its claim.”66 
The court held that in order to recover fees, charges, or costs, a cred-
itor must establish “(1) that it is oversecured in excess of the amount 
requested; (2) that the amount requested is reasonable; and (3) that 
the agreement giving rise to the claim provides for recovery of the 
fee, cost or charge requested.”67 
The interaction between state liquidated damages and section 
506(b) remains one of the least tested theories regarding make-
whole provisions.68 In GMX Resources, the court held that premi-
ums that resulted from an automatic acceleration due to a bank-
ruptcy filing were not subject to a reasonableness test.69 The court 
based its holding on the grounds that section 506(b) only applies to 
post-petition fees, charges, and costs.70 School Specialty held that a 
                                                                                                             
 62 Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 558. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 558–59. 
 65 Id. at 559. 
 66 In re Foertsch, 167 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1994). 
 67 Id. at 562; Murray, supra note 29, at 217. 
 68 Davidson, supra note 37, at 503. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, 2013 WL 1838513, *4 
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013) (stating that the majority view is that 506(b) does 
not apply to interest, costs, or charges that accrue prior to the bankruptcy filing); 
Davidson, supra note 37, at 503. 
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make-whole provision that is reasonable under state law is also rea-
sonable under the Code.71 
Some courts have held that the prepayment premium must re-
flect actual damages that have been incurred. In Coronado Partners, 
the court held that the state law allowed for the liquidated damages 
claim, but section 506(b) limits the damages to the actual damages 
incurred.72 In order to determine the actual damages, the court cal-
culated “the difference between the contract rate and the market rate 
from the date of prepayment until the date of maturity.”73 
In Kroh Brothers, the court also invalidated the prepayment pro-
vision because it improperly failed to approximate actual damages.74 
The court went on to say that section 506(b) only applies to actual 
damages, independent of state law considerations.75 In Duralite 
Truck Body, the court held that a prepayment fee based on a specific 
formula76 did not effectively represent actual damages and was 
therefore unenforceable under a liquidated damages analysis and 
section 506(b).77 The court explained that if the prepayment fee did 
not estimate actual damages, then the charge would either result in 
a windfall to the lender or a penalty to the borrower.78 
Cases that found prepayment provisions enforceable under state 
law were able to examine section 506(b) in more depth. In Financial 
Center Associates, the court held that a prepayment fee using a dis-
count rate tied to U.S. treasury bonds that resulted in a fee of 25% 
of the value of the loan was enforceable under state law and section 
506(b).79 The debtor argued that the fee was not commensurate with 
                                                                                                             
 71 In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, 2013 WL 1838513, *5 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Apr. 22, 2013). 
 72 In re Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd., 96 B.R. 997, 1001 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 
1989). 
 73 Id. at 1001; see Murray, supra note 29, at 224–25. 
 74 In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1000–02 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). 
 75 Id. at 1002. 
 76 In re Duralite Truck Body & Container Corp., 153 B.R. 708, 710 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 1993); Murray, supra note 29, at 224 (calculating the formula was based 
on the average total interest earned on the loan, multiplied by the remaining num-
ber of months until maturity, and then divided by two). 
 77 Duralite Truck Body, 153 B.R. at 714–15. 
 78 Id. 
 79 In re Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of East Meadow, 140 B.R. 829, 839 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1992); Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 561. 
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actual damages.80 However, the court rejected this argument and 
disagreed with the reasoning in Skyler Ridge and Kroh Brothers.81 
The court reasoned that damages are not easily proven because 
“many unknown factors” are present in determining actual dam-
ages.82 The court noted that hindsight should not be used in deter-
mination of the reasonableness of the damages.83 With regard to sec-
tion 506(b), the court stated that “at best we are willing to view the 
‘reasonable’ standard of section 506(b) in the context of pre-pay-
ment clauses as a safety valve which must be used cautiously and 
sparingly as all discretionary powers that are not subject to close 
scrutiny and statutory standard.”84 
In Anchor Resolution, the debtor conceded that the prepayment 
premium was enforceable under state law, but contested that the pro-
vision must also be reasonable under the Code.85 The court held that 
the formula for the premium was reasonable because unlike other 
cases that had a fixed rate of interest, here, the formula “accounts 
for changes in the Treasury rate, decreases over time, and has no 
‘minimum charge.’”86 The court found the premium reasonable for 
the formula used and the amount as a percentage of the principle.87 
B.   The Interaction Between Liquidated Damages and 506(b) 
Most courts agree that the first step in determining whether a 
make-whole provision is enforceable is to apply a liquidated dam-
ages analysis under state law.88 Under section 502(b)(1), claims 
should be determined by applicable non-bankruptcy law, i.e., state 
liquidated damages. Courts should not hold that parties are only en-
titled to actual damages under a liquidated damages analysis be-
cause there are many uncertain variables that make it difficult to as-
certain actual damages at the time the agreement was made. Also, 
                                                                                                             
 80 Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of East Meadow, 140 B.R. at 835–36. 
 81 Id. at 837. 
 82 Id. at 836. 
 83 Id. at 837. 
 84 Id. at 839 (The court noted that it is possible that a clause is valid under 
state law and not under the Code because it is extremely unjust to the estate). 
 85 In re Anchor Resolution Corp., 221 B.R. 330, 341 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998); 
Murray, supra note 29, at 228. 
 86 Anchor Resolution Corp., 221 B.R. at 341. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See supra Part I. 
2016] OVERCOMING HURDLES IN THE ENFORCEABILITY OF MAKE-WHOLE 
PROVISIONS 1011 
 
damages should not be limited to actual damages when represented 
and sophisticated parties negotiated these agreements. This clash 
among courts between actual damages and the negotiated agreement 
illustrates that two goals of contract law, inside and outside of bank-
ruptcy, are in conflict. These two goals are compensation for losses 
suffered and freedom of contract.89 
The reasoning in Skyler Ridge and AJ Lane makes numerous as-
sumptions about the ability of a lender to take the money from the 
prepaid loan and reinvest it into a similar transaction with a similar 
yield.90 These presuppositions assume low transaction costs, which 
may not be the case. The reasoning also assumes that determining 
actual damages at the time an agreement is made is quite simple. In 
reality, it is not simple at all. The courts in Hidden Lakes and Finan-
cial Associates found that there were many variables that were dif-
ficult to ascertain, such as the amount of interest lost on the prepaid 
loan; the costs and delays of obtaining a similar loan with another 
borrower; the applicable rate of return; the risk involved with the 
new loan; the extent and realizability of the collateral; and other un-
certainties.91 As the court noted in Financial Associates, “[t]he mere 
need for a formula, and the existence of different formulas used by 
different lenders show that the actual loss to be incurred may be dif-
ficult to determine.”92 Because of the impossibility of accurately 
predicting most variables in these types of loan agreements, courts 
should allow lenders to collect on prepayment fees regardless of 
whether they are representative of actual damages. Courts should 
not use the clarity of hindsight to interpret whether something was 
reasonable in calculating anticipated damages at the time of con-
tracting. Parties to these types of agreements should be aware of the 
consequences of prepaying a loan even if the prepayment premiums 
end up being much larger than actual damages to the lender. 
                                                                                                             
 89 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 22, at 474. 
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The court’s reasoning in Financial Associates and Hidden Lakes 
is most appropriate regarding the interaction between state liqui-
dated damages and section 506(b). Liquidated damages provisions 
are necessary because it is hard to determine actual damages from 
large loans at the time the agreement was made. It is also most ap-
propriate that make-whole provisions must separately pass a liqui-
dated damages analysis under state law and the 506(b) reasonable-
ness test. The Code seems to be a slightly stricter examination of the 
provisions on top of the liquated damages analysis. This conclusion 
comports with a distinction proffered by one court that just because 
a provision is enforceable under state law, does not mean it is rea-
sonable under section 506(b).93 Unless the provision is extremely 
inequitable, courts should leave the parties contractual relationships 
as intact as possible.94 Sophisticated lenders specifically bargained 
for their interest and courts should not be disallowing it. However, 
courts should be entitled to reduce an inequitable claim by lessening 
the amount of a make-whole provision because the main goal of 
bankruptcy is equitable reorganization. 
When lenders make loan agreements containing make-whole 
provisions, they should be aware that yield maintenance formulas 
are upheld more often because they are actually attempting to ap-
proximate damages. Courts will look at agreements that provide for 
a fixed fee or a percentage of the outstanding amount with greater 
scrutiny because such clauses do not attempt to approximate dam-
ages. However, yield maintenance formulas are more likely to be 
struck down as unmatured interest.95 
II.   PLAIN MEANING INTERPRETATION 
Courts have analyzed the plain meaning of contractual provi-
sions to determine if make-whole and no-call provisions were trig-
gered under a specific agreement. If a defeasance fee was not trig-
gered under the agreement, a discussion of its enforceability is null 
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and void. As discussed in Part II,96 the provision must also be en-
forceable under a state law liquidated damages analysis. AMR Corp., 
School Specialty, and GMX Resources illustrate that courts will al-
low or disallow make-whole provisions based on whether or not 
contracts have been finely drafted to be triggered under the given 
circumstances.97 
Additionally, there are questions of whether filing for bank-
ruptcy affects the maturity date of the loan agreement. Courts have 
concluded under section 502(b)(1)98 that filing for bankruptcy will 
accelerate the principle amount of all claims against the debtor.99 
Loan agreements can also provide that filing for bankruptcy is an 
event of default that accelerates the maturity date.100 These situa-
tions implicate the larger policy question of whether acceleration of 
the loan should be determined by the Code or by private contract. If 
the prepayment provisions are no longer applicable because the pay-
ment is no longer prepayment, then there is no reason to go deeper 
into the analysis. The lender can provide in the loan documents that 
a prepayment fee is due as long as the loan’s original maturity has 
not passed.101 As long as the loan’s original maturity has not passed, 
the lender will likely be able to collect the prepayment premium in-
side or outside of bankruptcy.102 The reason for acceleration provi-
sions in loan agreements is to avoid any problems with the automatic 
stay that bankruptcy imposes.103 In other words, the question is, 
even if the clause is a valid liquidated damages clause, has the bank-
ruptcy filing triggered that clause? 
                                                                                                             
 96 See supra Part I. 
 97 John F. Ventola & Sean M. Monahan, Caution: Make-Whole Provisions 
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In AMR Corp., the court held that the make-whole provision was 
unenforceable because the contract only provided for a premium if 
the prepayment was voluntary.104 American Airlines (“AMR 
Corp.”) voluntarily declared bankruptcy.105 However, according to 
the plain text of the contract, no make-whole premium was due upon 
automatic acceleration due to a bankruptcy default.106 
U.S. Bank was the holder of certain notes stemming from a se-
ries of three transactions with AMR Corp.107 The contract between 
the two parties clearly stated that a make-whole premium will be 
due in the event of a voluntary redemption, but a premium will not 
be due in the event of a mandatory redemption.108 U.S. Bank argued 
that AMR Corp.’s debt payment plan was properly construed as a 
voluntary prepayment and therefore subject to a make-whole pre-
mium.109 U.S. Bank also argued that it did not choose to accelerate 
the debt as a remedy, which would make the payment a prepayment 
and trigger the prepayment premium.110 In addition, U.S. Bank ar-
gued that these provisions were unenforceable ipso facto clauses.111 
Lastly, U.S. Bank argued that they should have been allowed to 
waive the acceleration of the debt or waive the event of the de-
fault.112 When the bankruptcy court denied all of U.S. Bank’s argu-
ments, it appealed directly to the Second Circuit.113 
The Second Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that a vol-
untary petition for bankruptcy was an event of default under the con-
tract provisions and that this default automatically accelerated the 
debt (this was according to Section 4.02(a)(i) of the indenture).114  
While the loan trustee had the option of accelerating in the event of 
other types of default, this was not the case with acceleration under 
                                                                                                             
 104 U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 730 F.3d 
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a voluntary petition.115 U.S. Bank made the previously illustrated 
arguments attempting to refute the court’s finding, but they were to 
no avail.116 
The Second Circuit agreed with AMR Corp. that this was a post-
maturity date repayment of an accelerated debt, instead of a prepay-
ment, which would not trigger a make-whole premium under the 
contract.117 The court also held that this did not violate section 
365(e) of the Code because it was not an executory contract, and a 
deacceleration of the debt would violate the automatic stay because 
it would modify the contractual rights of the parties.118 
In School Specialty, the make-whole provision was enforced be-
cause sophisticated parties bargained for a premium to be paid due 
to an automatic acceleration of the loan.119  School Specialty Inc. 
and a few affiliated companies entered into a credit loan agreement 
with Bayside for an aggregate principle amount of 70 million.120 Un-
der the credit loan agreement, the debtors were liable for a make-
whole fee for prepayment or acceleration of the loan.121 New York 
law governed this loan document.122 The court determined that the 
provision was an enforceable liquidated damages clause because 
precedent supported the use of an interest rate tied to treasury bills 
as the basis for the premium.123 
The committee argued that the provisions must also pass the sec-
tion 506(b) reasonableness standard.124 The court held that the pre-
mium was reasonable because it was not plainly disproportionate to 
the lender’s probable loss.125 The court did not actually say whether 
or not the standard even applied.126 The creditor’s committee also 
argued that the premium should be disallowed as unmatured interest 
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because the payment was intended to compensate for lost future in-
terest.127 The court held, in agreement with the majority of other 
courts, that the claim was not unmatured interest because the loan 
was fully matured under the contract due to the acceleration.128 
In GMX Resources, the indenture clearly provided for a make-
whole premium upon automatic acceleration due to bankruptcy.129 
The creditor’s committee argued that it was a penalty, but the court 
held the provision was a permissible claim for liquidated dam-
ages.130 Similar arguments to the ones in School Specialty were 
made and rejected by the court.131 In a recent bench ruling in MPM 
Silicones, the court held there was no unambiguous clause that made 
the make-whole premium due upon acceleration.132 Section 6.02 of 
the agreement stated “the principle of, premium, if any, and interest 
on the notes shall ipso facto become and be immediately due and 
payable.”133 The court held that this was not specific enough for the 
make-whole to be triggered by acceleration.134 
A.  Finely Drafted Agreements Are Key 
The courts in all of these cases looked to the plain meaning of 
the contract. While this sounds rather simple, the key to interpreta-
tion lies in whether the agreement requires a premium for post-ac-
celeration repayment or only pre-maturity prepayment.135 In AMR 
Corp., the agreement only provided for a make-whole premium 
upon prepayment.136 Therefore, the court held that no premium was 
triggered by the automatic acceleration due to the bankruptcy filing. 
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137 In GMX Resources and School Specialty, the parties contracted 
for a make-whole premium in the event of prepayment or automatic 
acceleration.138 In both cases, the court upheld the make-whole pro-
visions. Bankruptcy courts seem hesitant to enforce make-whole 
provisions that are not clearly spelled out in the contract.139 Many 
bankruptcy courts will look for reasons to disallow make-whole pro-
visions in order to keep assets unencumbered for other creditors.140 
Drafters need to be acutely aware of this going forward. 
When sophisticated lenders are fighting in bankruptcy, it is good 
policy for the court to give the lender nothing more than what it bar-
gained for in order to protect other creditors. Sophisticated lenders 
should receive their bargained for exchange, but only to the extent 
that it is specifically included in the plain meaning of the contractual 
agreement. Lenders need to be aware of what they are putting in 
their contracts and whether or not it will hold up in court. It seems 
likely that these types of lenders will learn their lesson from AMR 
Corp. and begin to include make-whole provisions that are triggered 
by either prepayment or acceleration due to bankruptcy. Finely 
drafted loan agreements will prevent lenders’ make-whole provi-
sions from being disallowed due to ambiguities in the contract. 
Therefore, whether or not the prepayment premium has been trig-
gered should become a non-issue in most cases. 
III.   UNMATURED INTEREST UNDER SECTION 502(B)(2) 
A final question is whether the make whole provision—even if 
a valid liquidated damages clause that was triggered in the bank-
ruptcy—is impermissible “unmatured interest” under Section 502.  
Section 502 says a claim is allowed unless, among other things, it 
amounts to a payment for unmatured interest.  Most courts have held 
that make-whole provisions are not subject to the Code’s prohibition 
on unmatured interest. However, some courts and scholars believe 
that the majority view is just a way to get around section 
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502(b)(2).141 Whether the lender is oversecured or undersecured is 
crucial to the analysis. The timing of the default and acceleration is 
also a key factor to be considered. 
Section 502(a) of the Code states that a claim or interest, which 
is properly filed under section 501, is allowed, unless a party in in-
terest objects.142 Generally, claims are allowed, unless a party in in-
terest can point to an exception under section 502(b). Section 
502(b)(1) of the Code states “such claim is unenforceable against 
the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or appli-
cable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent 
or unmatured.”143 Section 502(b)(2) states “such claim is for unma-
tured interest.”144 Section 502(b)(2) is an exception to otherwise al-
lowable claims that gives the party in interest the ability to object to 
a claim for unmatured interest.145 Section 506(b) of the Code allows 
for an oversecured creditor, up to the value of the collateral, to col-
lect interest on the claim and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges 
that are provided for in the loan documents.146 Therefore, if a pre-
payment fee is considered unmatured interest, then it is not allowed 
under section 502. And if the claim is not allowed under section 502, 
then it is not a secured claim under section 506.147 For purposes of 
this Comment, it is assumed that section 506(b) precludes post-pe-
tition claims of interest and reasonable fees and charges to everyone 
excluding oversecured creditors.148 
The biggest problem in the overall enforceability of make-whole 
provisions in bankruptcy is the interaction between liquidated dam-
ages and unmatured interest. The more the prepayment penalty is 
calculated as lost interest payments (actual damages), the more 
likely it will be enforceable under state law.149 However, the more 
the prepayment penalty looks like unmatured interest, the less likely 
it will be enforceable under section 502(b)(2). 
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Some scholars argue that sections 502(b)(2) and 506(b) must be 
read in conjunction with each other.150 When doing so, these schol-
ars argue it becomes clear that the Code only wanted the oversecured 
creditor to be able to accrue post-petition interest.151 The Supreme 
Court held in United Savings Association of Texas that an under-
secured creditor is not entitled to lost interest.152 Section 506(b) pro-
vides for an exception to section 502(b)(2) for oversecured creditors 
if the agreement allows for reasonable fees, costs, or charges.153 The 
majority view is that section 502(b)(1) acts to accelerate all debts at 
the petition date.154 Even though a claim may be unmatured before 
the filing, the bankruptcy petition has matured the debt.155 
The minority view is that although the unmatured claim is al-
lowable under section 502(b)(1), the nine prohibitions are cumula-
tive, and section 502(b)(2) clearly does not allow for unmatured in-
terest.156 These scholars view section 502(b)(2) as a specific prohi-
bition to section 502(b)(1)’s general allowance of a claim for a 
make-whole provision for undersecured creditors.157 When a debtor 
cannot even pay all the principle amounts of its debt, it would be 
inequitable to allow certain creditors to deplete the pool of assets by 
collecting interest.158 Once bankruptcy is filed, the Code displaces 
state law. In the context of make-whole provisions, these scholars 
argue that the bargained for premiums can be disallowed when it 
cuts against section 502(b)(2)’s prohibition on unmatured inter-
est159. 
Courts that hold prepayment clauses are not unmatured interest 
base their holdings on the view that everything has matured pursuant 
to the terms of the contract.160 If everything has matured pursuant to 
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the contract, then nothing is still unmatured when the right to pay-
ment of the loan in full has been triggered.161 Therefore, section 
502(b) doesn’t apply even though the premium is essentially equal 
to the present value of the remaining interest payments.162 It is much 
easier to invalidate a yield maintenance formula as unmatured inter-
est as compared to a fixed fee because a fixed fee looks nothing like 
unmatured interest.163 The analysis is made easier if acceleration 
happens before the bankruptcy petition. In Hidden Lake, Aetna ar-
gued that the prepayment fee is matured, is not interest, and is part 
of its claim.164 The court held that this claim is not for unmatured 
interest because the charge matured at the time the debt was accel-
erated.165 It did not matter that the premium was, in essence, for the 
estimated interest.166 However, the court did note that result might 
be different if there had been no prepetition acceleration.167 
The minority view holds that make-wholes are just an attempt to 
collect a loss in interest income and that is exactly what 502(b)(2) is 
attempting to stop.168 In Ridgewood Apartments, the court disal-
lowed a make-whole provision as a claim for unmatured interest be-
cause the claim was for contingent interest that was not matured at 
the time of the bankruptcy filing.169 The lender, Fannie Mae, accel-
erated the debt prior to the debtor voluntarily filing for bank-
ruptcy.170 The contract stated that the premium would be due if the 
prepayment was voluntary or involuntary.171 The court held that the 
prepayment must actually take place under the terms of the contract 
in order for the make-whole premium to be triggered.172 Because 
this claim was for contingent interest that was not due at the petition 
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date, an undersecured creditor will not be able to claim such 
amount.173 
Recently, in Hyde Park, the court held that a yield maintenance 
make-whole provision was correctly construed as unmatured inter-
est.174 Here, the debtor borrowed approximately $50 million secured 
by the hospital’s real estate.175 The court first held that the premium 
was not an unenforceable penalty.176 The court then went on to hold 
that the premium was unmatured interest.177 The court reasoned that 
the premium was unmatured at the time of the petition because the 
premium was triggered three months after the petition date by an 
acceleration of the loan due to a default.178 While the loan agreement 
did not define “interest,” the court found that the economic sub-
stance of the premium was indeed interest because it accelerated the 
interest on the loan that had not been accrued and made it all due 
immediately.179 The court compared the premium to an original is-
sue discount, which courts have determined is definitely interest.180 
The court also held that a premium can be a valid liquidated dam-
ages claim and still be disallowed as unmatured interest.181 Hyde 
Park illustrates that post-petition claims for a prepayment premium 
will have a harder time getting around the Code’s prohibition on un-
matured interest. 
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A.  Analysis of the Applicability of Section 502(b)(2) to Make-
Whole Provisions 
Some scholars argue that oversecured creditors that have a claim 
under section 506(b) are not subject to section 502(b)(2)’s prohibi-
tion on unmatured interest.182 However, this should not be the case. 
Section 506(a)(1) says that “an allowed claim of a creditor secured 
by a lien . . . is a secured claim.”183  Section 502 tells us what an 
“allowed claim” is, and section 502(b) excludes unmatured inter-
est.  Therefore, if a prepayment penalty is construed as unmatured 
interest, then it should not be allowed under section 502.  And if it’s 
not allowed under section 502, then it’s not a secured claim for an 
oversecured creditor. If the creditor is undersecured, it does not fall 
under section 506(b)’s protection and will not be able to collect on 
a prepayment fee anyway. 
These discrepancies present a substance versus form argument 
of whether section 502(b) should apply to make-whole premiums at 
all. The Code does not define unmatured interest. Case law has de-
fined unmatured interest as “interest that is not yet due and payable 
at the time of a bankruptcy filing, or is not yet earned.”184 One can 
argue that a prepayment fee is a charge that looks nothing like inter-
est in form.185 This argument is easier to make when the fee is a flat 
rate or a fixed percentage of the outstanding loan. When the fee is 
based on a yield maintenance formula, it looks much more like in-
terest.186 On the substance side, it can be argued that one should not 
be able to get around section 502(b)(2) by calling unmatured interest 
a make-whole provision.187 A yield maintenance make-whole pro-
vision is usually a complex formula that approximates the present 
value of all unmatured interest at the time of default. 
Section 502(b)(2) should stop make-wholes that are triggered 
once in bankruptcy where the loans are clearly not matured on the 
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petition date. Make-wholes should be allowed when the debt is ac-
celerated prior to bankruptcy and the provision has been triggered. 
The real question that courts need to decide definitively is whether 
section 502(b)(2) is a block to make-wholes when the acceleration 
is automatic due to a bankruptcy filing. It is hard to say with a 
straight face that the present value of all unmatured interest pay-
ments is not unmatured interest under 502(b)(2). However, the ma-
jority of courts have accepted the argument that nothing is still un-
matured when the debt is automatically accelerated due to a bank-
ruptcy filing. 
The imposition of yield maintenance type prepayment fees is a 
preferable lending policy. These are more likely to be accepted un-
der state liquidated damages analysis, as mentioned in Part II.188 
Courts have been reluctant to follow the minority view of disallow-
ing premiums because they are unmatured interest. Therefore, over-
all, the make-whole is more likely to be enforced if a yield mainte-
nance type fee is implemented. 
IV.   SOLVENT SITUATIONS 
Many relevant assumptions in insolvent cases, such as the bank-
ruptcy court’s goal of equitable distribution, do not apply in solvent 
cases.189 In insolvent cases, the bankruptcy court must use its dis-
cretion in order to fairly distribute assets to creditors.190 It would not 
be equitable to allow one creditor to impose a massive prepayment 
premium or collect interest when the other creditors are not going to 
get their principle back.191 If the proverbial pie is big enough to sat-
isfy all creditors, then any prepayment provision that is enforced in 
full does not serve to injure other creditors of the estate.192 While it 
is the exceptional situation that a debtor is solvent in bankruptcy, 
some scholars argue that undersecured and unsecured creditors 
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should also be allowed to collect interest notwithstanding section 
502(b)(2).193 
Recently, in Energy Future Holdings, the court allowed discov-
ery to determine whether the debtor was solvent.194 The court stated 
that “even in bankruptcy, a solvent debtor cannot escape its contrac-
tual obligations, but an insolvent debtor may rely on equitable prin-
ciples to argue [that] the premium should be reduced or not paid.”195 
If the debtors were solvent, then the provisions of the contract would 
be strictly enforced under the applicable state law.196 
If an agreement contains a no-call provision, but does not ex-
pressly provide for damages upon breach of the no-call, then courts 
have held that there is not a secured claim because the damages were 
not provided for under the agreement.197 However, there may be un-
secured claims. Also, the lender may have a claim for common law 
damages even if all prepayment premiums are inapplicable due to 
acceleration.198 Courts will allow damages from a breach of a no-
call only in solvent scenarios. As shown in MPM Silicones, the 
lender’s claim for damages from a breach of a no-call provision in 
an insolvent scenario was rejected as unmatured interest.199 
Chemtura may have laid some much needed groundwork in in-
terpreting make-whole and no-call provisions. In Chemtura, there 
were two sets of notes with maturity dates of 2016 and 2026.200 The 
2016 notes contained a make-whole provision, and the 2026 notes 
contained a no-call provision.201 The settlement, under the plan of 
reorganization in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, proposed an allowed claim 
of 50 million dollars under the make-whole provision to the holders 
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of the 2016 notes.202 The equity committee challenged the reasona-
bleness of this settlement because the allowed claim was 42% of the 
make-whole provision and 39% of the no-call provision if the pro-
visions were found enforceable. 203 It is to be noted that the court 
was not deciding the issues on the merits, but simply whether or not 
the settlement reached the level of reasonableness required by the 
Bankruptcy Code.204 
The court suggested that a two-prong test to determine the en-
forceability of these provisions was necessary.205 First, the court 
would determine whether or not the provision was triggered under 
the agreement and whether or not this was an enforceable state law 
claim, which includes calculating the amount due in order to deter-
mine if it is a penalty.206 The indenture document’s make-whole pro-
visions did not address whether or not a premium was triggered due 
to an automatic acceleration under a bankruptcy filing.207 The in-
denture with the maturity date in 2016 contained separate definitions 
of “maturity” and “maturity date.”208 The court concluded that the 
acceleration only affected “maturity.”209 Therefore, the “maturity 
date” was never changed and the prepayment occurred before the 
“maturity date,” which triggered the prepayment premium.210 The 
court also stated that the yield maintenance formula would require 
more investigation to determine if it was a disallowable penalty.211 
Nevertheless, the court noted that it would be reluctant to disallow 
the provision because sophisticated parties negotiated the con-
tract.212 
Second, if the provision were enforceable under state law, the 
court would have to determine if the special considerations in the 
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Bankruptcy Code would also allow the claim.213 These special con-
siderations are whether or not section 502(b)(2) or 506(b) require 
disallowance or reduction of the claim.214 The court stated that sec-
tion 502(b)(2) should only apply to situations where the debtor was 
insolvent, which was not the case here.215 
It is helpful to discuss the two prongs of this proposed test in the 
context of other relevant cases. The Chemtura court discussed mul-
tiple recent decisions in order to reach its conclusion that the settle-
ment was reasonable.216 In Calpine, the debtors filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy on December 5, 2005.217 Prior to the petition date, one 
of Calpine’s subsidiaries entered into a series of three lien financings 
for approximately 2.6 billion.218 The debtors filed a motion to seek 
financing in order to, among other things, repay the subsidiary’s 
debt.219 The refinancing would replace high interest rate debt with 
low interest rate debt, and this would save the company around 100 
million.220 Calpine subsidiary’s secured lenders raised objections ar-
guing that they were entitled to make-whole premiums.221 Six of the 
seven tranches of the debt had no-call provisions.222 The court cited 
many cases illustrating that, although no-call provisions are gener-
ally enforced outside of bankruptcy, upholding no-call provisions in 
bankruptcy would defeat the goal of equitable reorganization.223 
“The essence of bankruptcy reorganization is to restructure debt . . . 
and adjust debtor-creditor relationships.”224 All of the loan agree-
ments did say that filing for bankruptcy was an event of default that 
would automatically accelerate the debt.225 However, the agreement 
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did not provide for damages upon this acceleration.226 The court 
held that the breach of the no-call provisions did not allow for the 
right to enforce make-whole provisions.227 Also, the court held that 
the breach did not entitle the lender to secured claims, but the lender 
would have an unsecured claim for their expectation damages in an 
amount equal to that of a make-whole provision.228 
However, on appeal in district court, the court disallowed the 
unsecured claim for expectation damages because the indentures did 
not provide for such damages upon acceleration.229 The court rea-
soned that if the no-call provisions were unenforceable, then one 
could not incur liability for breaching them.230 The court also held 
that the claim is disallowed under section 502(b)(2) because the in-
terest had not matured as of the petition date.231 
The Solutia232 court agreed with the district court in Calpine. 
This court chose not to give damages for a breach of a no-call pro-
vision.233 The court reasoned that there was no prepayment because 
the notes had matured under the contract through automatic acceler-
ation at the petition date.234 If the notes were considered mature, then 
there could not be a prepayment.235 Because there was no prepay-
ment, the no-call provision had not been breached.236 The court in 
Solutia opined that the automatic acceleration provision shows the 
intent of the lenders “to give up their future income stream in favor 
of having an immediate right to collect their entire debt.”237 The 
Chemtura court disagreed, stating that there would be situations in 
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which damages for a breach of a no-call provision would be enforce-
able.238 
Premier Entertainment also disagreed with the district court’s 
analysis in Calpine. In Premier Entertainment, section 6.02 of the 
indenture said that if there was an event of default before February 
1, 2008, with the intention of avoiding the no-call provisions, then a 
prepayment premium would be due.239 The creditors argued that the 
default was willful and that the default was done with the intention 
of avoiding the no-call provision.240 The court found in favor of the 
debtors.241 The premium was not triggered because the debtors of-
fered sufficient evidence that they filed for bankruptcy in order to 
obtain insurance proceeds.242 The claimants were not able to meet 
their burden of showing the debtors’ requisite intent.243 The court 
found that there was no secured claim under section 506(b) because 
the automatic acceleration provision made the prepayment provision 
inapplicable.244 However, the court did hold that the breach of the 
no-call provision would give rise to an unsecured claim when the 
debtor is solvent.245 The court reasoned that the lender is not pre-
cluded from a monetary remedy just because specific performance 
is not allowed with respect to a no-call in bankruptcy.246 The 
Chemtura court agreed with this analysis of no-call provisions in 
bankruptcy when the debtor is solvent.247 
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A.   Bankruptcy Limitations Are Not Applicable When the Debtor 
Is Solvent 
As evidenced by the above examples, most scholars and courts 
agree that bankruptcy limitations regarding make-whole provisions 
should be lifted in situations in which the debtor is solvent. The lim-
itations should be lifted because there will be no harm done to any 
other creditors in a situation where everyone can be paid. Therefore, 
only state law considerations should apply when the debtor is sol-
vent. The Chemtura courts’s two-pronged analysis is a great frame-
work by which to analyze the enforceability of make-whole and no-
call provisions in bankruptcy. The lender in Chemtura was success-
ful because the court confirmed its claims as reasonable, but this was 
largely due to the fact that the debtor was solvent. The court noted 
that it would likely have held the minority view of disallowing de-
feasance fees as unmatured interest in insolvent cases.248 Lenders 
should take notice of this decision because if section 502(b)(2)’s 
prohibition on unmatured interest becomes the majority view, make-
whole and no-call provisions could become useless in bankruptcy. 
V.   IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The easiest way for a lender to secure enforcement of a make-
whole provision is to make sure the agreement is finely drafted so 
that it will be triggered after a bankruptcy filing. AMR Corp. and 
Solutia have confirmed that courts will consider payment after ac-
celeration as repayment and not prepayment, absent contractual lan-
guage to the contrary.249 Lenders should make sure that the premium 
is due in the event of automatic acceleration and voluntary prepay-
ment. Alternatively, the lender could require a prepayment fee 
whenever a debtor repays prior to the original maturity date.250 
Lenders need to make sure there are no exceptions to a make-whole 
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premium, like the one found in AMR Corp.251 Savvy lenders will 
also include an explicit statement that damages are due when a no-
call provision is breached. Specifying details about when damages 
are due gives the lenders a better chance to recover on a no-call in a 
solvent situation. Drafting issues should become a non-issue if lend-
ers are paying close attention to these rulings.252 If agreements are 
already in place, then the lender should use any leverage it has to 
amend the agreement with unambiguous language.253 
Based on the recent case law, it is best for lenders to include 
yield maintenance type make-whole provisions, instead of fixed 
fees. Yield maintenance provisions have a much better chance of 
being enforceable under state law because they actually attempt to 
approximate damages.254 While yield maintenance formulas are 
more likely to be seen as unmatured interest than a fixed fee, the 
majority view, as of now, is that make-whole provisions are not un-
matured interest. Plus, debtor-creditor relationships will not always 
end up in bankruptcy. While lenders should always prepare for the 
worst-case scenario, it is more important that the premiums are en-
forceable under state law because that is usually the first inquiry. 
This analysis can change, however, if the minority view with respect 
to unmatured interest becomes the majority view, and courts may be 
leaning that way, as shown in Chemtura and MCM Silicones. 
The enforceability of make-whole provisions raises some inter-
esting legal arguments. Article Nine of the U.C.C. allows for non-
advances, such as interest and attorney’s fees, and future advances, 
in some circumstances, to share the same priority as the original debt 
under a security agreement.255 Having the same priority as the orig-
inal debt means that the later incurred non-advances and future ad-
vances will have priority relating back to the time the security inter-
est was first perfected. Non-advances will have an easier time relat-
ing back to the original perfection date because future advances are 
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subject to knowledge, buyer in the ordinary course, and other stipu-
lations that may prevent relation back. Therefore, it can be argued 
that prepayments should also share the same priority as non-ad-
vances under Article Nine. Prepayments look more like non-ad-
vances than future advances. In a typical future advance, the lender 
extends more money to the debtor, which is secured under the orig-
inal agreement. This is not the case with prepayments, which look 
more like a charge or the present value of the interest outstanding. 
Prepayments, just like attorney’s fees, must be provided for under 
the agreement in order to be enforceable or permitted. Both attor-
ney’s fees and prepayments are negotiated for with an eye on the 
possibility of default and bankruptcy, and the resulting issues that 
will arise. 
Future expectation damages are usually allowed under the Code, 
but they are not with respect to interest.256 Under common law, a 
creditor is entitled to damages for a breach of a no-call provision, 
just like any other type of breach.257 Under contract law, an ag-
grieved party “is entitled to all damages proximately caused by the 
breach if the damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
contracting, they were unavoidable, and the aggrieved party can 
prove them with a reasonable degree of certainty.”258 Therefore, a 
creditor should be entitled to damages for a breach of a no-call pro-
vision if it meets the contract law stipulations even in insolvent sit-
uations. However, most courts have held that the legislative intent 
of section 502(b)(2) was to disallow future interest expectation dam-
ages.259 
There is a looming policy question of whether make-whole pro-
visions are beneficial overall. These rulings are a mixed bag as dis-
cussed previously. Some are encouraging lending by providing cer-
tainty because bargained for provisions are being upheld inside and 
outside of bankruptcy. Others are making lenders much more skep-
tical about disbursing funds because the lenders are unsure if they 
will receive their full expectation damages if the debtor’s business 
results in bankruptcy. This type of uncertainty is a large problem 
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going forward and one that needs to be resolved. Most people should 
agree that encouraging lending is a good thing because it increases 
the flow and availability of money, which strengthens the economy. 
However, secured lenders can hurt other types of creditors if make-
whole provisions are enforced. 
Once the debtor is in bankruptcy, the trustee is in control of the 
estate and any money that is distributed to a secured creditor will 
come out of the pocket of other unsecured creditors.260 Even if two 
sophisticated parties negotiated the original agreement, if the se-
cured party receives the benefit of a make-whole provision in bank-
ruptcy, the secured creditor will be taking money away from the es-
tate and other unsecured creditors who may be unsophisticated. 
These unsecured creditors did not have a say in the negotiations of 
the loan agreement, but their distributions under the Bankruptcy 
Code are being affected by a private agreement. Therefore, there is 
a question of whether two parties should be able to privately contract 
around a public law that sets forth how distributions are to be allo-
cated in bankruptcy. In partnership law, parties are able to contract 
around the default rules as long as it is explicitly stated in the oper-
ating agreement. So should the same be true of the Code? The Code 
is not a set of default rules that are only followed if the loan agree-
ment does not address an issue. However, make-whole clauses op-
erate within the confines of the Code’s restrictions. 
It is most appropriate that a party is given what it bargained for 
if it is within the rules of the Code. Unsecured creditors should know 
the rules of the game and realize the risks they are taking by lending 
on an unsecured basis. It can be argued that secured creditors should 
contemplate that a debtor can declare bankruptcy, which is well 
within debtor’s rights as determined by congress, and this displaces 
certain parts of the loan agreement. However, value should not be 
reallocated from secured creditors to unsecured creditors when a 
make-whole provision is otherwise enforceable under the Bank-
ruptcy Code just because one group has been injured. While there is 
a good argument that secured creditors have found a loophole in the 
Code to get around unmatured interest,261 the majority of courts 
have not seen it this way, and therefore, secured creditors should not 
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be punished for working within the Code. Another example of a 
workaround in the Code is the allowance of the payment of “perfor-
mance bonuses” when retention bonuses are not allowed.262 This is 
very similar to the allowance of a yield maintenance make-whole 
provision when unmatured interest is prohibited. By not enforcing 
make-whole provisions, courts would be giving the other creditors 
of the estate a backdoor way out of the original agreement the debtor 
had with the secured creditor. 
It is true that there are contract provisions that will not be en-
forced in bankruptcy, such as a blanket default provision giving a 
secured creditor collateral in all of the debtor’s property. Legisla-
tures do not want to allow these types of provisions because they 
could easily be put into every lending agreement and bargaining 
power will not be equal in all circumstances. A blanket default pro-
vision would greatly reduce a debtor’s ability to finance anything 
else after a default because it could no longer give first position in 
its collateral. A make-whole provision is not the type of provision 
that should be invalidated because it does not have the same con-
cerns. In fact, make-whole clauses may give a debtor a better oppor-
tunity to finance their business because the debtor can chose to opt 
out of a loan agreement after payment of a fee if there are possible 
savings to be had. Also, a bankruptcy court can use its equity powers 
and lessen a make-whole provision, while still rendering it enforce-
able. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for a make-whole provision to be enforceable, the pro-
vision must be a valid liquidated damages clause under state law, it 
must be provided for and triggered under the agreement, and it must 
not be tantamount to unmatured interest. Often, a ruling can come 
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down to which party the court feels should prevail.263 Even if the 
agreement is perfectly drafted, a court could reject an outcome to 
preserve the estate for other creditors using the wiggle room pro-
vided for in either a state liquidated damages analysis or a section 
506(b) reasonableness analysis.264 Also, most debtors in bankruptcy 
are insolvent, so the equities of the case can come into play in order 
to partially invalidate a make-whole provision.265 Lenders can im-
prove their chances of having make-whole clauses enforced, but 
they can never be certain of all of the risks involved because of the 
wiggle provided by the Code and the valid policy arguments dis-
cussed in Part V.266 
Overall, it is the best policy to enforce make-whole provisions 
negotiated between sophisticated parties, unless the result of the pro-
vision is unconscionable. While unsecured creditors will suffer in 
circumstances where make-whole provisions are enforced, they will 
have the ability to more easily obtain financing because lenders will 
be more certain of the enforceability of their agreements. The results 
of more generous lending will benefit the economy and outweigh 
the harm caused to the unsecured creditors in individual cases. The 
increased ease of financing is the rising tide that will benefit all par-
ties involved. 
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